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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Legal status as an Indian is not determined solely upon the basis of race. It is also based 
upon a person's recognition as an Indian by the Indian community with which he associates. Due 
to legal circumstances peculiar to the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation, Defendant/Appellant 
Perank did not enjoy legal status as an Indian prior to October 8,1986 (the date of his enrollment). 
His status as a non-Indian at the time of commission of all criminal acts complained of, including 
parole violations, brings him within the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah. He was appro-
priately prosecuted under the laws of the State of Utah. The appeal should be dismissed upon the 
ground that Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, was not an Indian at the time he came under the 
criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to leave of the Court granted November 10, 1987, the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation (hereafter called "the Tribe") hereby files this brief amicus curiae. 
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, claims that he is not subject to the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the State of Utah because he is an Indian. Appellant's brief states that, although he was not 
an enrolled member, he was eligible for enrollment under the tribal constitution and was, therefore, 
an Indian. Amicus curiae, Ute Indian Tribe, believes that there are serious omissions in the briefs 
of Appellant, Respondent, and amici curiae^ Duchesne and Uintah Counties regarding Appellant's 
legal status as an Indian. It appears to the Ute Indian Tribe that the parties and other amici curiae 
are not as interested in analyzing the threshold issue of Appellant's legal status as an Indian as they 
are in convincing the Court to use this case to assist them to obtain review of a civil case1 by the 
United States Supreme Court after that court denied certiorari. 
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, is the offspring of a full-blood Ute and a non-Ute 
mother who has some Indian (not Ute) blood. Thus, Mr. Perank has a maximum of 4/8 Ute blood 
and possibly less. As explained below, he was viewed as a mixed-blood by the Tribe and was not 
considered an Indian in the legal sense until he was enrolled as a tribal member pursuant to a ruling 
of the Tribal Appellate Court which allowed him a window of opportunity to enroll. If he had not 
enrolled when he did, he would still be considered a non-Indian by the Tribe due to an 
Amendment2 to the Ute Tribal Constitution which was adopted earlier this year and which closed 
the window of opportunity for certain mixed-bloods, including Appellant, to enroll. 
Due to events peculiar to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, it has 
become necessary for the Tribe to regard all persons as non-Indians in a legal sense unless and un-
1
 Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 107 S.Ct 596 (Dec. 1,1986). 
2
 Amendment to the Ute Tribal Constitution adopted April 12, 1988, effective April 15,1988, requires a minimum 
of 5/8 blood relationship to persons whose names appear on the roll of full-bloods published April 5, 1956. 
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, does not qualify for enrollment under this standard. 
1 
til they become enrolled members of the Tribe or of another federally recognized tribe. For exam-
ple, the jurisdictional provisions of the Ute Law and Order Code3 carefully state that membership 
(enrollment) in the Tribe or in another federally recognized tribe is a prerequisite to the Tribal 
Courts assuming personal jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters. To the Ute Indian Tribe, 
enrollment in a federally recognized Indian tribe is the sine qua non of a person's legal status as an 
Indian.4 This view is more restrictive than guidelines which have evolved in the courts for the 
determination of legal status as an Indian in other Indian communities5. It is a rational view which 
has its roots in the circumstances surrounding the Ute Partition Act6 and in the need to draw a 
clear distinction between those who are legally considered Indians and those whose special status 
as Indians has been terminated by act of Congress. 
Prior to 1954, the Tribe consisted of persons of full-blood Ute ancestry and also of mixed-
blood offspring of full-bloods who married non-Utes. Congress passed the Ute Partition Act in 
1954. 25 U.S.C. § 677v terminated the mixed-blood's entitlement to federal services which were 
available "because of their status as Indians," and federal jurisdiction over them which attached 
"because of their status as Indians."7 Rolls were published April 5, 1956 setting forth the names 
of persons who were considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be full-blood Utes and those 
who were considered mixed-bloods subject to termination. Membership in the Ute Indian Tribe 
and, consequently, a person's special legal status as an Indian is now determined by a person's 
ancestral relationship to those 1,314 full-bloods whose names are listed on the published roll. 
Approximately 490 mixed-bloods had their legal status as Indians terminated effective Au-
gust 27,1961. Although they obviously remained anthropologically of Indian ancestry, they were 
no longer subject to the special restraints which were characteristic of their former legal status as 
3
 § 1-2-5 of the Ute Indian Law and Order Code: Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations 
contained in either federal law, or the Tribal Constitution, the Courts of the Ute Indian Tribe shall have jurisdiction 
over all civil causes of action, and over all offenses prohibited by this Code except the Courts of the Ute Indian Tribe 
shall not assume jurisdiction over any civil or criminal matter which does not involve either the Tribe, its officers, 
agents, employees, property or enterprises, or a member of the Tribe, or a member of a federally recognized tribe, if 
some other forum exists for the handling of the matter and if the matter is not one in which the rights of the Tribe 
or its members may be directly or indirectly affected. 
4
 This definition has been very helpful in the Tribe's efforts to follow the holding that Tribal Courts do not have 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians [Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191; 55 L. Ed. 2d 
209; 98 S. Ct 1011 (1978)]. The federal government also has used this definition in determining who is subject to 
the jurisdiction of its Courts of Indian Offenses. See 25 CFR 11.2(c): "For the purpose of the enforcement of the 
regulations in this part, an Indian shall be deemed to be any person of Indian descent who is a member of any 
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction..." [emphasis added] 
5
 See United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1974) for another example of the effect of a termination act on 
jurisdiction. See Duro v. Reina 821 F.2d 1358; 1987 U.S. App.LEXIS 8883 at Lexis page [*13] for review of 
standards used in other cases. 
6
 25 U.S.C §§677-677aa. 
7
 Donna Land Maldonado and Barbara Land Cuch, Plaintiffs, v. Donald P. Hodel, Ross O. Swimmer, Defendants, 
Civil No. 86-C-1050G United States District Court For The District Of Utah, Central Division, 683 F. Supp. 
1322; 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3276 February 19, 1988 at Lexis page [*23]. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) 
2 
power to enter into contracts. Neither did they enjoy the economic benefits thereof.8 
Property was divided between, the terminated mixed-bloods and 'the Tribe. Federal super-
vision over property belonging to the n dxed-bloods was also terminated Since mixed-bloods 
were no longer entitled to federal services nor entitled to participate in the economic benefits of 
tribal membership, it became necessary to draw a clear distinction between those who were legally 
considered Indians and those who were not. Enrollment as a member of the Tribe was the only 
truly workable criterion upon which, federal and 'tribal benefits could, be based, In the heteroge-
neous population of .mixed-bloods and full-bloods living in the Uinta Basin, a. person, does not 
achieve the legal status of being Indian until he or she is enrolled as a member of the Tribe ' Fhis 
criterion "becomes increasingly important with the passage of time. Full-bloods may marry mixed-
bloods or members of other races. The eligibility of their children for special legal,,, status as Indi-
ans depends "upon the children's genealogical, relationship to the original, published roll of full-
bloods and other factors. It is very desirable from, an administrative viewpoint to have a, prospec-
tive tribal member prove the requisite genealogical, status, birthplace and residence of parents at 
rime of bi rth in an application for enrollment and thereafter simply refer to an enrollment number 
when various benefits of Indian status are being sought "I his criterion, also allows persons who 
are eligible for enrollment and who have not enrolled to avoid the legal, status of being an, Indian, if 
they prefer the less restrictive lifestyle enjoyed by non-Indians. The price for such freedom,, is that 
those persons do not enjoy the benefits of Indian status unless and until they enroll as members at 
some later date. 
Felix,, S. Cohen, in his Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1,940) states at page 2, column 2: 
Recognizing the possible diversity of definitions of "Indianhood," we 
may nevertheless find some practical value in a definition of "Indian" as a person 
meeting two qualifications: (a) That some of his ancestors lived in America be-
fore its discovery by the white race, and (b) that the individual is considered an 
"Indian" by the community in which he lives. 
The function of a definition of "Indian" is to establish a test whereby it 
may be determined whether a given individual is to be excluded from the scope of 
legislation dealing with Indians 
It is argued In Appellant's brief that Defendant/Appellant, Clinton, Perank, should be considered an 
Indian because he was eligible for enrollment. Cohen,fs definition, above, turns not on a, person's 
eligibility, but on, recognition, of "Indianhood" by the community in, u hich he lives, Cohen's is a 
workable definition,, because it takes into consideration the differing circumstances among the 
various Indian communities. At page 5 column 2 of his Handbook, Cohen explains one rationale 
8
 Donna Land Maldonado and Barbara Land Cuch, Plaintiffs, v, Donald,, P. Model, Ross O. Swimmer, Defendants, 
Civil No. 86-C-1050G United States District Court For The District, Of Utah,,, Central Division,, 683 F Supp. 
1322; 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3276 February 19, 1988 at Lexis page [*2] 
3 
behind using tribal membership as a criterion for "Indianhood." He refers to the CFR definition of 
Indian (see footnote 4 herein): "...any person of Indian descent who is a member of any recog-
nized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction."9 Cohen then states: 
This definition exemplifies the idea that in dealing with Indians the 
Federal Government is dealing primarily not with a particular race as such but 
with members of certain social-political groups towards which the Federal Gov-
ernment has assumed special responsibilities. 
The need to clearly differentiate between those persons for whom the federal government still has 
special responsibilities and those whose special relationship has been terminated has led the Ute 
Indian Tribe to emulate the federal practice of recognizing persons of Ute descent as Indian only 
after they have been enrolled as members of the Tribe. For many years, the Tribe followed the 
criterion of a minimum of 5/8 blood from those listed on the April 5,1956 fiill-blood roll. The 5/8 
blood quantum requirement was set by an ordinance enacted by the Tribal Business Committee. 
The Ute Tribal Appellate Court10 ruled that the 5/8 blood quantum requirement was inconsistent 
with its interpretation of the criteria for eligibility contained in the tribal constitution and, therefore, 
invalid. Pursuant to this ruling, the Tribe allowed Appellant and other mixed-bloods to enroll. An 
amendment to the Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe was adopted April 12,1988, effective April 
15, 1988 which elevated the 5/8 blood quantum requirement to constitutional status. Thus, Ap-
pellant would not be eligible to enroll if he had not enrolled when he did. 
Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, was enrolled as a member of the Ute Indian Tribe on 
October 8,1986. All of the alleged criminal acts took place prior to that date. Prior to October 8, 
1986, Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, was not an Indian in the eyes of the Indian community 
in which he lives. He was, therefore, subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah and 
was appropriately prosecuted under Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal should be dismissed upon the ground that Defendant/Appellant, Clinton Perank, 
was not an Indian at the time he came under the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted this nineteenth day of July, 1988. 
9
 This is the federal equivalent to the definition used by the Ute Indian Tribe in § 1-2-5 of its Ute Law and Order 
Code (see footnote 3 above). 
1 0
 Haskell Levi Chapoose, et. al. v. Ute Tribe, et. al., Civil Numbers: 9-78,11-78, 133-77,144-77 (combined). 
4 
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